<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Philosophy on Patrick Stevens</title><link>/categories/philosophy/</link><description>Recent content in Philosophy on Patrick Stevens</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-gb</language><lastBuildDate>Sat, 08 Mar 2025 13:30:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="/categories/philosophy/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>A Bitcoin analogy for Multiple Drafts theory of consciousness</title><link>/posts/2025-03-08-consciousness/</link><pubDate>Sat, 08 Mar 2025 13:30:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/posts/2025-03-08-consciousness/</guid><description>I&amp;rsquo;ve never actually seen anyone write down precisely the way I think about consciousness, so here it is: it&amp;rsquo;s (gasp!) like a blockchain.</description></item><item><title>NativeAOT in .NET 9 and Nixpkgs/darwin</title><link>/posts/2024-11-28-net9-aot/</link><pubDate>Thu, 28 Nov 2024 20:10:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/posts/2024-11-28-net9-aot/</guid><description>How to get a NativeAOT build using nixpkgs</description></item><item><title>Mary's Room</title><link>/posts/2024-10-25-marys-room/</link><pubDate>Fri, 25 Oct 2024 23:30:00 +0100</pubDate><guid>/posts/2024-10-25-marys-room/</guid><description>Last weekend I was in a discussion ostensibly about whether the mind is nonphysical. Much of the discussion ended up as a rather polite shouting match about Mary&amp;rsquo;s Room. Here is what I actually believe about it.</description></item><item><title>My objection to the One Logical Leap view</title><link>/posts/2013-07-18-my-objection-to-the-one-logical-leap-view/</link><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jul 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/posts/2013-07-18-my-objection-to-the-one-logical-leap-view/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;A large chunk of the reason why changing someone&amp;rsquo;s mind is so difficult is the fact that our deeply-held beliefs seem so obviously true to us, and we find it hard to understand why those beliefs aren&amp;rsquo;t obvious to others. Example:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A: A god exists - look around you; everything you see is so obviously created, not stumbled upon!
B: No, that&amp;rsquo;s rubbish - look around you, everything you see is easily explained by understood processes!&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Prerequisites for hypothetical situations</title><link>/posts/2013-07-14-prerequisites-for-hypothetical-situations/</link><pubDate>Sun, 14 Jul 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/posts/2013-07-14-prerequisites-for-hypothetical-situations/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Usually when I discover (or, more rarely, think up) a thought experiment about a moral point, and discuss it with an arbitrary person whom I will (for convenience) call Kim, the conversation usually goes like this:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Me: {Interesting scenario} - what do you think?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Kim: I would just {avoids point of scenario by nitpicking}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Me: You know what I meant. {applies easy fix to scenario to prevent nitpick}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Kim: Well then, I&amp;rsquo;d {avoids point of scenario by raising unrelated moral issue}&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>The Multiple Drafts view of consciousness</title><link>/posts/2013-07-14-the-multiple-drafts-view-of-consciousness/</link><pubDate>Sun, 14 Jul 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/posts/2013-07-14-the-multiple-drafts-view-of-consciousness/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;I&amp;rsquo;ve been reading one of &lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Dennett"&gt;Daniel Dennett&amp;rsquo;s&lt;/a&gt; books, &lt;em&gt;Consciousness Explained&lt;/em&gt;. Aside from the fact that the author has an incredible beard and is therefore correct on all matters, he can also write a very cogent book. In &lt;em&gt;Consciousness Explained&lt;/em&gt;, Dennett outlines what he calls the Multiple Drafts approach to explaining consciousness; this blog post is my attempt to summarise that view in a couple of short analogies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dennett starts off by providing evidence that our time-perception is somewhat malleable: we can interpret &lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Color_Phi_phenomenon"&gt;two dots of different colours&lt;/a&gt; (appearing separated by a short distance in time and space) as a single moving dot that changes colour abruptly at some point. The key puzzle here is that we perceive the colour to have changed &lt;em&gt;before&lt;/em&gt; seeing the second coloured dot. Dennett then outlines what seem to be the two mainstream points of view on how this happens.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>A framework for discussing "pricelessness"</title><link>/posts/2013-07-12-a-framework-for-discussing-pricelessness/</link><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jul 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/posts/2013-07-12-a-framework-for-discussing-pricelessness/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Sometimes some people argue that certain things are &amp;ldquo;priceless&amp;rdquo; - that is, worth an infinite amount of money to them. I posit that what this really means is that it would take work and uncomfortable imagination to evaluate the worth of that thing to them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The example that triggered this framework was my evaluation of how much my sense of smell was worth to me. (It was late at night and I couldn&amp;rsquo;t get to sleep, so I just let my mind wander around for a bit.) I was unable to quantify the amount I would pay to keep my sense of smell, but it is certainly finite, as the following thought experiment demonstrates.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>